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1Abstract
Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch's research on the social and institutional
changes in the postbellum American South, summarized in their One Kind of Free-
dom, raised many controversies. One of them concerns the degree of competition
among the advancing merchants of the rural South. Ransom and Sutch's assertion
that such merchants held a \ territorial monopoly" is usually criticized as being
at odds with the high level of postbellum entry in the rural merchandising sector
and the absence of signi¯cant costs to entry. The question is still open, as shown
by a recent special issue of Explorations in Economic History. This paper o®ers
a contribution to this controversy by showing that high level of entry in the mar-
ket and excessively high prices need not to be in con°ict. In particular, using the
theory of incomplete information games to study the competition between an ad-
vancing merchant and a potential entrant, the practice of over-pricing is shown to
be an equilibrium behavior if interpreted as a way of signaling information about
the market riskiness.
Riassunto
One Kind of Freedom, che contiene una dettagliata analisi sui cambiamenti so-
ciali, istituzionali ed economici nel Sud degli Stati Uniti dopo la guerra civile, ha
sollevato numerose controversie. Fra queste, quella riguardante il livello di com-
petizione nel mercato delle merci acquistate a credito dai contadini. La teoria di
Ranson e Sutch, secondo cui il mercato delle merci a credito era a tutti gli e®etti
un monopolio (rispetto al territorio in cui ogni negozio operava), µ e stata spesso
criticata perch¶ e di±cile da giusti¯care visti l'elevato numero di nuovi negozi aperti
nel periodo in esame e l'assenza di signi¯cativi costi di entrata. La questione non e
ad oggi risolta, come dimostra un recente numero speciale della rivista Explorations
in Economic History. Questo lavoro contribuisce al dibattito mostrando che prezzi
molto elevati (anche superiori ai prezzi di monopolio) possano essere compatibili con
l'aumento di competizione dovuto all'apertura di nuovi negozi se interpretati come
un modo per segnalare informazione sul livello di rischiositµ a del mercato. Questo
2viene fatto rappresentando la competizione fra il mercante e un potenziale entrante
come un gioco ad informazione incompleta. La rilevanza del modello per l'analisi
dell'economia post-guerra civile del Sud degli Stati Uniti µ e a lungo discussa.
31 Introduction
Ransom and Sutch's One Kind of Freedom1 gives a thorough account of
the economic and social history of agriculture and rural ¯nancing in the
South of the United States after 1865. According to Ransom and Sutch,
the poor performance of the economic institutions emerged after the Civil
War hindered the accumulation of capital and the growth of the Southern
economy. Among such institutions, the rural merchandizing system played
a key role: monopolistic country stores controlled both the credit and the
merchandising markets of the rural South, charging excessively high interest
rates on goods bought on credit and providing credit only on the condition
that their customers grew cotton. This system resulted in debt peonage and
in the persistence of cotton as the prevalent Southern crop long after this
choice had ceased to be convenient.
Ransom and Sutch explain debt peonage as a consequence of the \ter-
ritorial monopoly" the rural stores enjoyed. Looking at the geographical
distribution of the rural stores in the Cotton South,2 they show that the av-
erage distance between any two stores was too big to allow the customers to
sample more than one store. Furthermore, the practice of buying on credit
and using the future crop as collateral, coupled with the frequent inability to
fully repay debts at the harvesting season, contributed to tie the customer
to his merchant.
Many conclusions that Ransom and Sutch reached in their book raised
controversies. In particular, the theory of a \territorial monopoly" is, ac-
cording to some,3 at odds with two observations on the postbellum stores:
the low entry costs due to the limited capital required to start a new busi-
ness operating, as the stores were, on credit4 and the high number of new
stores that entered the Southern markets from 1867 to 1880.5
These two observations led some scholars to question Ransom and Sutch's
analysis. Some believe that the estimate of the rate of interest implicit in
the two-price system, one for cash and the other for time payments, is bi-
ased upward.6 However, the existence of debt peonage and the fact that
4stores had usually some sort of monopoly power is supported by many re-
ports of the time.7 Others think that high credit prices were justi¯ed by the
default risk and that the risk-adjusted rates of return to store owners were
reasonable.8
Despite a quarter of a century has elapsed since Ransom and Sutch's
book was written, most of these controversies are still unresolved. Given
their importance in evaluating the economic conditions of the african-ame-
ricans, the question has recently received new attention in a special issue of
Explorations in Economic History.9
This paper o®ers an alternative explanation of why excessively high in-
terest rates were compatible with sustained entry in the market and no bar-
riers to entry. Our theory relies on the fact that the incumbent store owners
had privileged access to information on the farmers' credit-worthiness and
interprets high prices as signals to scare potential entrants away. The the-
ory of incomplete information games is applied to the furnishing economy
of the South to show that prices could be used as devices to transmit the
information that the customers had poor credit records. Such signals, by
revealing that the market was not pro¯table enough to support new stores,
induced the potential entrants to stay out. The analysis also reveals that
a certain amount of entry is compatible with such behavior, because new
stores would open whenever the customers' credit records were good. Such
an equilibrium behavior would explain why, on average, prices could be high
despite the opening of new stores.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the
pre and post war organization of agriculture production in the South, and
its distribution and ¯nancing. In particular, we compare the plantation
system with the tenant farmer system in order to understand what shaped
the change in institutions. Particular emphasis is given to the way the
two systems were ¯nanced and to the role of the factor versus that of the
advancing store. In Section 3 we present Ransom and Sutch's \territorial
monopoly" theory, according to which one of the main sources of market
5failure in the postbellum Southern economy was the monopolistic power
of the country stores. We also examine some of the controversies that this
theory has raised and discuss few open questions. In Section 4 we look at the
competition process between an advancing merchant and a potential entrant
by introducing, as a novel element of the analysis, the advancing merchant's
informational advantage on his customers' credit standing. In particular, the
section gives a non-technical summary of the results one gets representing
the furnishing economy as a model of entry in which the incumbent merchant
has privileged information on his customers' credit standing with respect
to potential entrants. The complete analysis of the asymmetric information
game representing the competition process is given in the Appendix. Finally,
in Section 5, we o®er some conclusions.
2 Postbellum economic and social institutions
Before the Civil War the plantation system made the South a prosperous
economy. The plantations were engaged in the extensive production of crops,
like sugar, cotton and tobacco, destined for the great part to markets in the
North of the Union or abroad. The transactions with non-Southern mar-
kets were handled by specialized intermediaries called factors. The factorage
system started in the colonial period when planters shipped their crops to
England, entrusting a factor, usually based in London, to sell them and
use the proceeds to buy goods and commodities to be shipped back to the
colony. After the Revolution the system survived and it actually strength-
ened as the trade center shifted from London to the new large cities of the
Union. Charleston, Wilmington, Mobile, New Orleans and other coastal
cities became the seat of operation for numerous commissioner merchants.10
The primary services o®ered by the factors were the sale of the crops and
the purchase of the supplies needed to run the plantation. Typically, the
factor's activity was not restricted to the mere handling of goods. Rather, it
encompassed the supply of all the ¯nancial services related with such trans-
actions and, frequently, even of those unrelated with them. For example, the
6factor played as intermediary between the planters and the city banks, usu-
ally by endorsing the planters' promissory notes. Since the factor handled
all of his customers' market dealings, he knew thoroughly their economic
and ¯nancial strength and, thus, he was willing to guarantee for their good
standing.
After the Civil War the old system collapsed; the tenure system and the
credit merchandising system ¯lled the vacuum left by the end of slavery and
of the factorage system.
The abolition of slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution required new ways to organize agriculture labor. In 1865 and 1866,
most of the prewar plantations had been re-established and the new freed-
man were o®ered wage, lodging and rations in exchange for their labor. New
incentives, in the form of tournaments among work gangs, were introduced
to substitute for the use of coercion and corporal punishment.11 These ex-
periments, however, were short-lived. In the next few years, a change in both
the planters' and the freedmen's attitude towards the ¯xed wage contracts
resulted in their demise.12
On the planters' side, in 1866 and 1867, a sharp decrease in the price of
cotton and a prolonged drought jeopardized the pro¯tability of the planta-
tions. Confronted with the ensuing economic losses, the planters tended to
blame the unwillingness to work of the freed slaves. Furthermore, the new
system exposed the planters to the opportunistic behavior of the workers.
The abolition of slavery caused a considerable decrease in labor supply|
through an obvious increase in the amount of leisure|thus giving the work-
ers a remarkable bargaining power: at the beginning of the picking season
they could ask an increase in wage or better condition of work not provided
for in the contract and get away with it, simply by threatening the planters
of leaving the plantation.13
Discontent was spreading among the emancipated blacks too. Very little
had changed with respect to slavery, except for wages. Plantations' work-
ers were often living in the old slaves' cabins, eating the same rations and
7wearing the same clothes as they did as slaves. The blacks, usually illiterate
and untrained to negotiate a contract, were in some cases cheated and de-
frauded by their masters. Even when the plantation owner was honest and
fair, the postbellum shortage of money did not help. Reports show that the
planters were not always able to pay the workers at the agreed time, thus
contributing to the discontent.14
Eventually, the freedmen pushed for alternative arrangements that gave
them independence from the old masters. The plantation lands were divided
in many small plots and rented to both white and black farmers. These ten-
ant contracts ranged from ¯xed-rate lease to sharecropping. Sharecropping
itself could take di®erent forms. Sometimes the farmer agreed to pay a ¯xed
percentage of his crop as rental for the land. More often he was supplied
not only the land but also farm tools, animals and fertilizers.15
The introduction of the tenant system caused a drastic decline in the
farm size. From 1860 to 1880, in the nine large cotton-planting states,
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas, the size of the average \farm" declined from
347 acres to 156 acres and the number of farms increased from 449,936 to
1,110,294.16 By 1880 the plantation system had ceased to exist.
With the change in labor organization came a change in the intermedi-
ation and ¯nancial services to agriculture. The kind of intermediation that
the factors used to o®er to the planters did not ¯t the tenant farmers. A
small family farm had no need to move supplies in big quantities as the
former planters did. As for credit and the endorsement of promissory notes,
tenant farmers did not have land or slaves as collateral for their loans; they
could only o®er their future crops as a guarantee but the factors, living
in the big seaport cities, could not possibly undertake the supervision of a
myriad of small farms to make sure that the crop was up to the amount of
the debts. Thus, such basic liaison between the farmers and the city banks
disappeared.
Banks also failed to directly supply credit to Southern tenant farmers.
8Before the war, Southern banking outsized the northern in terms of amount
of capital invested, banknotes issued and deposits, but it deeply su®ered
the devastating blow of the outcome of the war. Most state banks had
invested in the Confederate Government notes and bonds and went bankrupt
when these ¯nancial assets lost their value. Immediately after the war, the
shortage of money hindered a swift resumption of credit activities and the
system collapsed. In 1865 only a few Southern banks reopened their doors.17
The National Banking Act, which was passed in 1863 while the South was
out of the Union, perpetuated these initial di±culties. The Act ruled that
no national bank could be chartered with a capital of less than $50,000. It
also imposed restrictions on loans, by outlawing mortgages on real estates.
Banks could still receive a charter from the state but in 1866, to induce
state chartered banks to become national, a 10% tax on all state bank issued
notes was introduced. As a last resort there were unchartered private banks.
However, without charter they could not issue banknotes, leaving them with
no means to ¯nance their activity.18 In the North, unchartered banks could
use demand deposits, that is accounts against which checks could be written,
to ¯nance their business. The postbellum South, however, was bereft of any
kind of savings and, thus, could not have a signi¯cant amount of deposits.
The Act, thus, had the e®ect of restraining the growth of banking over the
rural areas of the United States, where the limit imposed on capital was too
high compared with the prospective amount of the deposits. In this way, it
promoted a transfer of funds from agriculture to industry.19
The condition of Southern banking in the ¯fty years after the Civil War
can be assessed by looking at Table 1, which shows the geographical distri-
bution of United States banks from 1880 to 1909. In 1900 Southern banking
had not yet recovered from the wartime collapse: with only 1,617 banks, the
South had less than one sixth of the banks in the United States. Among
Southern states, cotton states ranked even lower.
[TABLE 1]
9The total number of banks, however, does not give a full picture of the
shortage of banking services in the rural areas. National and state banks,
for example, were likely to be big city banks. The available statistics do
not allow to recover the number of banks in the rural area, but we can get
a (likely upward biased) estimate of their number by subtracting from the
number of commercial banks the number of national and state banks. This is
termed Small Banks in the last four columns of Table 1. In 1880, there were
a few savings and private banks in the Cotton South but they progressively
disappeared in the following years. In 1900 the absence of small banks is
striking: two out of ¯ve states had none, Louisiana had only two.
The di®erences in availability of banking services between the Cotton
States and other parts of the United States is even more striking if we look
at Table 2, which shows the ratio of inhabitants to each bank. In 1900, for
example, the ratio was 7,337 persons per bank in the United States, 13,655
in the South and 17,548 in the Cotton States; therefore the South and the
Cotton States had, respectively, a ratio of about two and two and half times
those of the United States. Di®erences are even more marked when we look
at small banks: in the same year there were 33,372 persons per small bank
in the United States as a whole; in the Cotton South the ratio was more
than ten times that, a striking 378,090.
[TABLE 2]
The in°uence of the National Banking Act lasted through the beginning
of the twentieth century. In 1900 the Gold Standard Act lowered the capital
requirement to $25,000 for towns with less than 3,000 inhabitants. But the
act came too late both because the use of demand deposits had made the
charter less essential to the banking activity and, especially, because the
habit to get credit from the stores had already been strongly established.
The shortage of credit supply after the war was even worse if compared
with the demand side. Credit, in fact, was in big demand in the ¯rst years
10after the war because the freedman who had turned into farmers had no
capital to start the planting season, their only resource being their labor.
For lack of other credit intermediaries, the task of ¯nancing the farmers
was taken up by the rural stores. Before the war, rural stores had played
a marginal role in the plantation economy. The planters, dealing in large
quantities, could get cheaper goods from the cotton factors who, in turn,
dealt directly with the city wholesalers. Only occasionally the planters went
to the rural stores and it was not uncommon to ¯nd villages without any
store. Country stores traded for the most part with small farms that had
neither the collateral nor the volume of trade to enter the factorage system.
To these farms the store-keeper o®ered, on a di®erent scale, the same services
that the factor o®ered to the planters: he supplied any kind of commodities
required and he managed the sale of the crops. Stores usually played the role
of ¯rst collecting agents for cotton. The crops, gathered from the numerous
farms, were ultimately marketed through the intermediation of a factor.20
The number of stores remained very small throughout the antebellum
period. In 1840, the state of New York had one retail store to each 199
inhabitants and Pennsylvania had one to 264 persons. In the same year the
ratio in Louisiana was 474 and it was 657 in Alabama. Small towns with
more than one store could only be found where farms were more numerous.21
Not many stores survived the war and the ¯nancial collapse of the Con-
federate system that followed.22 However, after the war the recovery of
retail merchandising was quite rapid. Wholesalers from the North were ea-
ger to bene¯t from the enormous potential for business that the Southern
markets o®ered and they were willing to overcome the shortage of money
by selling on credit. As in any other transactions on credit, there was the
problem of verifying the credit worthiness of the stores. But this problem
was solved through the services of an independent debt rating agency, the
R.G. Dun Mercantile Agency, which supplied information on the reliability
of the business ¯rms investigated and their credit ratings. The Mercantile
Agency, founded in New York in 1841, after the war extended promptly
11its activity to the South. Thanks to this development, the Southern stores
could receive goods on consignment and pay for them from six months to
one year later.23
This credit could, in turn, be passed to the farmers, as long as the ad-
vancing merchant could get some guarantee in case the farmer failed to pay.
The only collateral that most farmers could o®er was the future crop. Thus,
shortly after the end of the war, crop lien laws allowing to mortgage the
ungrown crop were passed in all the cotton-planting states. The mortgage
could then be used to get credit to buy the supplies required to grow the
crop itself and pay for the use of the land.
The introduction of the crop lien laws was initially accepted as the only
salvation for a wrecked economy and it was meant to be temporary. Instead,
the new laws became more widespread that slavery itself, since they extended
their e®ects to white farmers.24 They gave the stores enormous power and
contributed to turn the local merchant from a simple merchandising agent
to the ¯nancial and banking institution of the rural South.25
In order to decide how much to advance to their customers, merchants
needed to evaluate their customers' credit worthiness. However, the prox-
imity of the merchant to his customers made the task, if not easy, at least
feasible. According to reports of the time, storekeepers routinely spent some
of their time travelling in the countryside to oversee the crops and the e®ort
farmers were spending in growing them.
This overview shows that it was a combination of legal, economic and
organizational reasons that led to the emergence of the advancing merchant
as supplier of both goods and credit. This double role had important eco-
nomic consequences that deserve to be further inquired. This is what we do
in the next section.
3 Monopolistic rural stores?
A basic tenet of Ransom and Sutch's One Kind of Freedom is that rural
merchants used to charge exorbitant interest rates for the loans they made.
12This point is open to dispute since interest rates were not explicit: in the
nineteenth century, usury laws prohibited the taking of interest exceeding a
certain rate; so, in order to circumvent these laws and simplify computations,
the rural store used to charge two di®erent prices, one for cash purchases
and the other for goods bought on credit.
All the reports of the time show that credit prices were much higher
than cash prices; however, they do not agree on the size of the di®erence.
Ransom and Sutch, in their thorough inquiry, ¯nd that the implicit interest
rate averaged 60%, an amount that, by any reasonable assessment of default
risks and cost of supervision, was far in excess of the opportunity cost of
capital.26
Ransom and Sutch maintain that the exorbitant prices are evidence of a
clear monopoly power of the Southern rural stores that they justify on the
basis of a model of spatial competition. They argue that, even if the stores
were quite evenly scattered over the area, they could enjoy a geographical
limited monopoly due to the high cost of travelling. They estimate an
average distance between stores from 5.5 to 9 miles, a long distance in the
rural South of 1880. Due to this cost, the rural stores in the South had, in
their areas of in°uence, very limited competition and enjoyed a \territorial
monopoly".
The conclusion that competition was restrained simply by transportation
costs, however, is not convincing. In models of spatial competition with free
entry the mark-up over marginal cost is proportional both to transportation
costs and to the ¯xed cost of entry.27 In the rural South, neither of these
costs seem high enough to justify the observed mark-up.
Let us consider transportation costs ¯rst. Even if, as Ransom and Sutch
suggest, it could take a farmer \the better part of a day" to sample two
stores, we know that agriculture is characterized by periods in which the
farmers are not very busy. In days of reduced activity the opportunity cost
of the trip could be very low. Furthermore, from the selection of goods that
were usually purchased, we can infer that there was no need to go often to
13the store. Items commonly bought were farm implements, various kinds of
fabric, salt pork, corn and molasses. Fresh vegetables and fruit were not in
the list of the goods commonly purchased.28 These two observations suggest
that the actual cost of transportation need not be very big.
The same can be said for the ¯xed cost of entry. The fact that the
scale of operations was usually small suggests that ¯xed costs were likely
to be moderate. Reports from the Mercantile Agency show that 36.5% of
the stores had a \pecuniary strength"29 of less than $2,000 and 48% of less
than $5,000.30 A study for Alabama shows that merchants had a capital
lower than that suggested by Ransom and Sutch and that their pecuniary
strength went down over the period 1870{1900.31 Furthermore, the stores
could enjoy favorable terms of credit from competitive northern wholesalers,
thus limiting their capital requirement to the collateral requested by their
suppliers.
Ransom and Sutch, in a subsequent contribution, suggest that a model
of spatial competition with free entry need not be adequate because the ter-
ritorial monopoly of the country store was protected by various barriers to
entry. Among these, they list ostracism of outsiders by the Southern society,
the fact that landlords could hinder the shift of tenant farmers away from
their established merchant, the political and social power of the established
merchants that discouraged the customers from shifting their patronage else-
where, and economies of scale which made ¯rms with capital lower than
$5,000 poor risks.32 Notice, however, that all of these reasons, except for
economies of scale based on capital requirements | a controversial point, as
we pointed out above | are sociological in nature; therefore, Ransom and
Sutch's explanation of barriers to entry abandons a pure economic ground.
The existence of barriers to entry, moreover, seems at odds with the data
on the number of new stores. Goldin, for example, reports that from 1870 to
1885 there was a rapid growth in the number of stores in the Cotton South;
the average annual rate of increase between 1870 and 1875 was 18.5%, 4.9%
between 1875 and 1880 and 7.8% from 1880 to 1885. Similarly, in a study of
14the furnishing sector in Alabama, Gill ¯nds that a steady process of market
penetration took place in the last three decades of the nineteen century, with
the number of farms per store decreasing steadily over time.33
These data, together with the evidence of monopoly power, leave us
without an economic explanation of why stores could charge excessive credit
prices. in the next section we try to give one.
4 Overpricing as an entry deterrent
The overview of the postbellum rural South we gave in the last two sections
stresses the importance of the advancing stores' double role: credit inter-
mediaries and supplier of goods. So far, this essential aspect has not been
formally considered in economic models of competition among furnishing
merchants. We believe that this is crucial in understanding the economics
of the rural stores.
The starting point of our analysis is that the monopolistic power that
stores had in the market for credit had an important in°uence on their eco-
nomic power in the market for goods; therefore, credit intermediation and
the price of goods cannot be analyzed separately. More precisely, as we
saw in the previous section, farmers' supervision was part of the advanc-
ing merchant tasks, since repayment of the credit advanced depended on
future crops. This necessary surveillance gave the established stores an in-
formational advantage with respect to potential entrants. We claim that
this asymmetry of information in°uenced the way stores set their prices
and, therefore, shaped the competition between merchants. In other words,
the competitive behavior of the stores cannot be analyzed on the basis of
spatial competition considerations alone because this would neglect the in-
formational advantage merchants got from playing the role of a ¯nancing
institution.
Our model takes as given Ransom and Sutch's simplifying assumption
that stores in di®erent villages were not in competition with each other and
investigates the competitive behavior of an incumbent store and a poten-
15tial entrant in a single village, under the hypothesis that the established
merchant had private information on the village farmers' ¯nancial strength.
We consider a simple two-period model in which a potential entrant
chooses whether to enter the market after having observed the price charged
by the incumbent. Since the incumbent knows the default rate when he
makes his pricing choice, the incumbent's price may contain information on
what he knows; in other words, prices may be used to signal the quality of
the market and, thus, to a®ect the entry decision.
Using prices as signals has two consequences. First, if under symmetric
information the price re°ects only costs and the degree of competition, when
information is asymmetric the price level is also determined by being used
as signal. Second, if prices are used to deter entry, the incumbent may enjoy
barriers to entry beyond those implied by ¯xed costs.
The analysis of the role that these two facts play on the bias that asym-
metric information imposes on prices and on the existence of informational
barriers to entry is based on a signaling game whose assumptions and equi-
libria are presented in the Appendix. Here we give a non technical summary
of our main ¯ndings.
Suppose, for simplicity, that there are only two types of markets: high
and low default rate markets and that a potential entrant is not interested
in a high default rate market because the latter does not allow two stores
to break even.
If information on the default rate was available to incumbents and en-
trants alike, potential entrants would stay out from markets with high de-
fault rate and they would enter those with low default rate. Under such con-
ditions, prices would not have any signaling function and we would expect
them to be high in bad default markets as the result of both monopolistic
power and higher rates of default and to be low in good default rate markets
because of both competition and a lower default rate.34
When information is asymmetric, however, the economic conclusions on
prices and entry can be very di®erent because prices may be used to send
16information on the default rate to the potential entrant; this signaling op-
portunity changes the equilibrium behavior because the potential entrant's
entry decision may now depend on the incumbent's pre-entry pricing choices.
Two classes of equilibria potentially exist for this simple signaling game:
separating and pooling. In a separating equilibrium prices play a signaling
role; therefore, potential entrants may look at them to \separate", i.e. dis-
tinguish, good markets from bad markets. In a pooling equilibrium, on the
other hand, no information is signaled. Thus, entrants do not learn any-
thing about the quality of the market from the incumbent's pricing choice
but prices are nevertheless in°uenced by the fact that they could, poten-
tially, be used as signals. Given reasonable economic assumptions35 the two
types of equilibria are characterized as follows.
In separating equilibria prices are never lower than the monopoly price.
This is so because high prices signal that the monopolist su®ers large costs to
recover his customers' unpaid credit and, therefore, the potential entrant's
expectation on pro¯t is decreasing in prices. This induces incumbents with
high default rate to price higher than their monopoly price, even if this
signaling strategy is costly in the short period. Incumbents with a low rate
of default, on the other hand, in the second period are going to lose their
monopoly regardless of how they price and, therefore, they charge their
monopoly price.36 Separating equilibria, then, o®er an explanation of why
overpricing is consistent with entry.
Let us now look at pooling equilibria. These are characterized by no
entry and prices that could possibly (but need not) be larger than the
monopoly price. Pooling equilibria, therefore, do not necessarily explain
the observed coexistence of overpricing and entry. However, these equilibria
exist only if duopoly losses in high default rate markets are high and if a
large share of the markets are high default rate. Based on our overview of
the postbellum rural South, we believe that this was probably not the case.
In fact, even if the percentage of \bad" markets was probably large, , in
particular immediately after the war, losses were likely to be limited given
17the reduced scale of the stores and the fact that entry costs were marginal.
5 Comments and conclusions
This paper analyzes a model of competition among advancing merchants in
the postbellum rural South of the United States. The analysis shows that
over-pricing could be an equilibrium behavior even in the absence of entry
costs. In fact, a price higher than one's monopoly price could be used as
a signal about the quality of the market when the information between the
incumbent and the potential entrants was asymmetric. The analysis also
reveals that a certain amount of entry is compatible with such over-pricing,
as in our model entry occurs in the best segment of the market. The model
we proposed, therefore, provides a possible solution to the controversy raised
by Ransom and Sutch's theory of a `territorial monopoly". By doing so, it
suggests that the lack of market institutions to collect information on the
farmers' ¯nancial worthiness was one of the causes of the postbellum South
market failure.
In our model the monopolistic power of the country stores stems from
an informational advantage. The facts presented in Section 2 suggest that
the landlord, as a party in the sharecropping contracts, knew the ¯nancial
soundness of his tenants as much as the stores did. Therefore, according to
our model, landlords had a strong incentive to cash their informational rent
by entering the merchandising business and, conversely, merchants had an
incentive to acquire the land in order to keep their monopoly on information.
This occurrence is actually con¯rmed by the reports of the time. Woodward,
for example, reports that:
\a strong tendency early asserted itself [...] for merchant and
planter to become one|that is, for the merchant to acquire
the farms of the hapless landowner, and for the more fortunate
planters to move to town and become supply merchants."37
A possible criticism of our model is that it can hardly explain the per-
18sistence of both overpricing and entry over time. In fact, after the ¯rst
period, all information become and overpricing to deter entry is no longer
necessary. Similarly, all entry occurs once and for all at the beginning of
the second period. However, this is an artifact of the simplifying two-period
assumption. A situation of perpetual signaling could be obtained, at the
cost of more technicalities, along the line of Mester by assuming that the
default rate changes across periods and that each year default rate is only
imperfectly correlated to the next.38 This is a reasonable assumption be-
cause the customers' ability to repay their debt in a single year was likely
to be in°uenced by the weather, the state of the cotton market and other
variables that changed over time.
A Appendix: the model and its equilibria
We present a model of entry with asymmetric information in order to show
the importance that the informational advantage of the incumbent store had
in credit merchandising.39
Consider a two period game with two players, an incumbent I and a
potential entrant E. The incumbent chooses a price pI; after observing it,
the potential entrant decides whether to enter, charging a price pE, or not.
The entrant can always get a pro¯t of zero by not entering the market.
Players have the same discount factor ±.
Assume constant returns to scale and let c1 be the marginal cost of
supplying the good. Since the commodity being sold is a credit good, c1
includes both the wholesale price paid by the store and the costs connected
to the credit, i.e. the opportunity cost of capital and the cost of supervision.
Let Q(p) be the downward sloping market demand at price p. The
market is characterized by an average default rate d that could be low (d =
dL) with probability x or high (d = dH) with probability 1 ¡ x, where
dt 2 [0;1] and dL < dH. Only the incumbent knows d. In case of default,
the store can recover the unpaid credit through the seizure of the collateral
or by extending the credit to the following year. This has a cost of c2 per
19unit of good sold.
Let Mt(p) be the one-period monopoly pro¯ts40 at price p when the
default rate is dt, t = L;H. Then
Mt(p) = Q(p)(p ¡ c1) ¡ c2Q(p)dt:
De¯ne pt
M as the monopoly price for a default rate dt and Mt as the corre-
sponding level of pro¯t, that is, Mt = Mt(pt
M).
We assume that the entrant observes d upon entering the market, so
that the post entry solution is the complete information solution. De¯ne
Dt
I and Dt
E to be, respectively, the incumbent's and the entrant's complete
information duopoly pro¯t when the default rate is dt, where Dt
E could
possibly include a cost of entry.
The facts presented in the previous sections and basic economic princi-




I for t = L;H;
(A2) DH
E < 0 < DL
E;
(A3) MH ¡ DH
I < ML ¡ DL
I :
The ¯rst two assumptions are straightforward: (A1) says that a store is
better o® if it is the only store in its village and (A2) that a high default rate
market is not good enough to support two stores and, in particular, that
the entrant in such market cannot break even. Assumption (A3), which says
that a store in the high default village has a greater advantage on the entrant
than one in a low default rate village, follows from the terms of the crop-lien
laws. According to reports of the time, the farmer who was granted by the
store an extension of the debt into the following year was bound to that store
by the terms of the crop-lien. Then, the lower the default rate the larger the
new store's chances of taking away customers from the incumbent, because
the number of customer tied by law to the incumbent store was smaller.
20We also assume that:
(A4) ML ¡ ML(pH
M) < ±(ML ¡ DL
I ).
Assumption (A4) rules out the uninteresting case in which the informa-
tion on the default rate can be strategically conveyed at no cost. For more
on its implications see Footnote 44.
The subgame perfect equilibrium in the benchmark case of complete
information is simply found by backward induction. By Assumption (A2),
when the default rate is high the entrant stays out because he prefers a pro¯t
of zero to the loss that he would incur by entering; instead, he enters when
d is low. Since this entry strategy does not depend on the pricing policy of
the incumbent, the latter cannot in°uence the entrant's decision. Then the
best he can do in the ¯rst period is to charge his monopoly price. This leads
to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When the entrant knows dt, in the subgame perfect equilib-
rium the incumbent charges his monopoly price pt
M and the entrant enters
only if the default rate is low.
Therefore, when the information on the market is public, we expect to
see more than one store whenever the market is big enough to support them.
Things may be very di®erent, however, when the incumbent store has
private information, because the price might be used to send information on
the default rate to the potential entrant; this signaling opportunity changes
the equilibrium behavior because the the potential entrant's entry decision
could now depend on the incumbent's pre-entry behavior.
Too see why, consider, for example, the complete information equilib-
rium strategies. With asymmetric information the incumbent's strategy of
charging the monopoly price, i.e. pL
M or pH
M depending on the true default
rate, need not be the best choice if the default rate is actually low. In fact,
when the price is pH
M, the potential entrant conjectures that the market is
high default and decides to stay out. But then, an incumbent with a low de-
fault rate may try to deter entry by charging pH
M to mislead the entrant. In
21particular, this could be a pro¯table deviation if the pro¯t lost by not charg-
ing one's monopoly price is more than recovered by not sharing the market
with a competitor in the second period. If this is the case, it is not rational
for the entrant to infer that the default rate is high when the ¯rst period
price is pH
M and his entry decision may, accordingly, be changed. Therefore,
the existence of private information may in°uence both the pricing and the
entry behavior.
Before illustrating the equilibria of the game, we consider the players'
strategy sets. Since the incumbent behavior may depend on his information,
we shall consider two types of incumbent: a high type, whose default rate is
dH, and a low type, with default rate dL. We denote by p(H) and p(L) the
pricing strategies of the two types. The potential entrant cannot condition
his entry choice on the default rate since he does not know it. However,
before entering the market, he observes the price and he can condition his
entry decision on it. The entrant's behavior depends also on his conjectures
about the default rate. We call these the entrant's beliefs. We let ¹(p) 2
[0;1] be the entrant's beliefs that the default rate is low and e(p) : I R !
fin;outg be his strategy when the incumbent charges p. A strategy and
beliefs pro¯le, therefore, is given by [p(L);p(H);e(p);¹(p)].
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is given by a pricing strategy for each
type of incumbent and an entry strategy and beliefs for the entrant such
that the pricing and entry strategies maximize the expected pro¯t at any
information set (given the strategies of the other player) and the entrant's
beliefs are \reasonable", i.e. consistent with Bayes' rule and the strategy
pro¯le.
Two classes of equilibria exist for this simple signaling game: separating
and pooling. In a separating equilibria di®erent types of incumbent play
di®erent pricing strategies, i.e. p(H) 6= p(L). In this case, the information
is fully conveyed because the potential entrant can infer the true default
rate from the price he observes. Sometimes, however, the information is
not revealed by the price because the price charged by the incumbent is the
22same regardless of the true default rate, i.e. p(H) = p(L). The equilibrium
is said to be pooling because the ¯rst period price does not depend on the
incumbent's type.
Separating equilibria
In a separating equilibrium, the entrant can infer the true default rate by
observing the price. Therefore, if the default rate is low he enters and if it
is high he stays out; entry occurs as it would with symmetric information.
Prices, conversely, are in°uenced by their signaling function and in equi-
librium they are never lower than the monopoly price. To see why, notice
that a price p for an incumbent in a high default rate market to be a credibly
signal must satisfy the two following conditions:
MH ¡ MH(p) · ±(MH ¡ DH
I ); (1)
ML ¡ ML(p) ¸ ±(ML ¡ DL
I ): (2)
The ¯rst one, an individual rationality constraint, says that in case of
high default the incumbent is willing to reveal his information because the
pro¯t lost by sending the signal p is smaller than the reward of keeping the
monopoly. The second, an incentive compatibility constraint, ensures that
under low default it is too expensive for the incumbent to mimic the signal
of the other type and deter entry.41
The two conditions are illustrated by Figure 1. The two curves ML ¡
ML(p) and MH ¡ MH(p) in the ¯gure represent the pro¯t that the incum-
bent of type L and H, respectively, lose when they charge p instead of their
monopoly price. Each curve intersects the x-axis at the monopoly price.42
The two horizontal lines ±(ML ¡ DL
I ) and ±(MH ¡ DH
I ) represent, instead,
the two types of incumbent's discounted loss in pro¯t when entry occurs.
Condition 1 is veri¯ed for any price for which the thinner curve MH ¡
MH(p) lies below the thinner line ±(MH ¡ DH
I ). Similarly, Condition 2 is
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Figure 1: Separating equilibrium prices.
the thicker line ±(ML ¡ DL
I ). The intersection of the two sets is given by
the interval [p¤;p¤¤]. This is the interval of possible separating equilibrium
prices p(H) for the high default rate incumbent.42 Since the interval [p¤;p¤¤]
lies to the right of pH
M, the incumbent with high default rate engages in over-
pricing. That is, he charges a price higher than his monopoly price in order
to deter entry.44 A full description of the separating equilibrium prices is
given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In a separating equilibrium the low incumbent charges his
monopoly price pL
M and the high incumbent charges a price p(H) ¸ pH
M:
Furthermore, entry occurs only when the default rate is low.












0; if p = p(H)
1 otherwise
],
where p(H) satis¯es Conditions 1 and 2.
24First notice that by rationality of beliefs ¹(p) is consistent with Bayes'
rule and the strategy pro¯le for p = p(L) and p = p(H). Bayes' rule does not
apply for all other (out of equilibrium) prices, hence ¹(p) can be arbitrary
at those prices.
Given ¹(p) and Assumption (A2), the entrant's strategy is a best re-
ply. Moreover, any price di®erent from p(H) triggers entry; therefore, by
Condition (2), the low incumbent's best reply is his monopoly price and, by
Condition (1), the high incumbent's best reply is p(H). We conclude that
the pro¯le is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
To show that there are no other equilibrium outcomes, suppose that
¹(p) is such that it deters entry for some (out of equilibrium) price p = 2
fp(L);p(H)g. Then, the low incumbent best reply would be to charge p.
But then ¹(p) would not be rational.
Finally, since pL
M < pH
M and ML ¡ ML(p) is increasing for p > pL
M, by
Assumption (A4) p(H) ¸ pH
M: r
Notice that the information can be credibly conveyed in equilibrium
because over-pricing is more expensive for the low default rate incumbent;
in fact, by paying the cost c2 to recover the unpaid credit for a lower portion
of customers, he has lower average costs. For this reason, he does not want
to choose p(H) and mimic the high default incumbent even if this would
deter entry.
Pooling equilibria
Before concluding that overpricing is the outcome of the game we need
to analyze pooling equilibria. In these equilibria no information can be
inferred because both types of incumbent charge the same price, that is
p(H) = p(L) = ¹ p.
A necessary condition for the existence of a pooling equilibrium is given
in Proposition 3.









d(M  -D   ) L L
I   
d(M  -D    )
H H




Figure 2: Pooling equilibrium prices.
Proof: Suppose xDL
E +(1¡x)DH
E ¸ 0 and consider a pooling equilibrium
pro¯le [¹ p; ¹ p;e(p);¹(p)]. By Bayes' rule ¹(¹ p) = x and, therefore, e(¹ p) = in.
Since entry is not deterred, the best that both types of incumbent can do in
the ¯rst period is to choose their own monopoly price. But pL
M 6= pH
M. Then
the types do not pool. r
Under the condition of Proposition 3 a potential entrant prefers to stay
out of the market when he is uncertain about its quality because his expected
pro¯t xDL
E +(1¡x)DH
E is negative.45 Notice that entry is always deterred
in a pooling equilibrium because, if it were not, both types of incumbent,
faced with the sure end of their monopoly, would charge their own (di®erent)
monopoly prices.
The set of possible pooling equilibrium prices is characterized by the
following two conditions:
ML ¡ ML(¹ p) · ± (ML ¡ DL
I ) (3)
26MH ¡ MH(¹ p) · ± (MH ¡ DH
I ) (4)
Notice that, since the price is the same for both types, incentive compat-
ibility is trivially satis¯ed. Still, to guarantee that ¹ p is a pooling equilibrium
price, the two individual rationality Constraints (3) and (4) must hold, i.e.
incumbents with di®erent default rates must both be willing to charge ¹ p.
The set of poolingequilibrium prices is illustrated by the interval [p#;p##]
in Figure 2, found as the intersection of the set of prices for which the thicker
curve lies below the thicker line, as required by Condition 3, and the set of
prices for which the thinner curve lies below the thinner line, as of Condi-
tion 4.
As Figure 2 shows, a pooling equilibrium price need not be larger than
the monopoly price. However, for the particular market we are analyzing,
pooling equilibria are not likely to exist, because the necessary condition
for the existence of these equilibria is hardly satis¯ed. In fact, this would
require a large negative value of DH
E, the duopoly pro¯t in a high default rate
market, together with a high percentage x of high default markets. Even if
x was probably large, particularly immediately after the war, the loss in a
high default rate duopoly must have been small given the reduced scale of
the stores and the fact that entry costs were marginal.
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32Table 1: Geographical distribution of banks
Banks of all Sortsa Small Banksb
States 1880 1890 1900 1909 1880 1890 1900 1909
South Carolina 25 50 54 272 13 16 11 38
Georgia 71 92 181 573 58 20 9 34
Alabama 35 47 48 274 26 6 0 24
Mississippi 33 59 113 352 33 0 0 19
Louisiana 21 28 78 222 4 3 2 9
Cotton States 185 226 474 1693 134 45 22 124
Other Southern 490 757 1,143 3,450 294 53 110 308
Southern 675 1,051 1,617 5,143 428 116 132 432
Eastern 1954 1,455 1,783 2,715 1,128 336 439 786
New England 1,084 1,114 1,108 1,080 512 513 524 578
Western 359 1,503 1,648 4,331 309 577 106 185
Middle Western 2,285 2,664 3,732 7,709 1,356 971 980 2,023
Paci¯c 175 414 490 1,481 103 103 98 275
Non Southern 5,857 7,150 8,761 17,316 3,408 2,500 2,147 3,847
United Statesc 6,532 8,201 10,378 22,450 3,836 2,616 2,279 4,279
Source: Statistics for the United States 1867-1909, compiled by A. Piatt Andrew, National
Monetary Commission, Washington, 1910, Tables 4 and 7.
a Includes national, state, savings, and private banks and trust companies.
b Banks of all sorts minus national and state banks.
c The United States do not include the island possessions.
33Table 2: Number of Inhabitants to Each Bank
Banks of all Sortsa Small Banksb
States 1880 1890 1900 1909 1880 1890 1900 1909
South Carolina 39,823 23,022 24,820 5,553 76,583 71,944 121,844 39,748
Georgia 21,720 19,971 12,244 4,463 26,588 91,867 246,240 75,215
Alabama 36,071 32,191 38,097 7,709 48,557 252,163 | 88,011
Mississippi 34,290 21,857 13,728 5,076 34,290 | | 94,040
Louisiana 44,759 39,945 17,713 7,289 234,985 372,820 690,807 179,795
Cotton States 31,738 25,034 17,548 5,661 43,819 153,543 378,090 77,298
Other Southern 19,133 14,732 12,041 4,609 31,889 215,424 125,117 51,626
Southern States 22,588 17,438 13,655 4,955 35,624 157,991 167,279 58,995
Eastern 6,016 7,919 7,594 7,418 10,421 34,292 38,966 25,623
New England 3,699 4,219 5,046 5,795 7,831 9,162 10,670 10,828
Western 5,452 2,540 3,106 1,555 6,334 6,616 48,290 36,404
Middle Western 6,906 7,296 6,183 3,371 11,637 19,943 23,546 12,846
Paci¯c 7,964 5,480 6,294 2,461 13,531 22,026 31,470 13,254
Non Southern 5,958 5,828 6,161 3,624 10,239 16,669 25,140 16,315
United Statesc 7,678 7,365 7,337 3,943 13,072 22,936 33,372 20,624
Source: Statistics for the United States 1867-1909, ibid..
a Includes national, state, savings, and private banks and trust companies.
b Banks of all sorts minus national and state banks.
c The United States do not include the island possessions.
34